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In deciding as it did, the court of appeals further rejected the ap-
pellee's contention that Paragraph III of the injunction was necessary
to protect the court's jurisdiction over the action before it. The ap-
pellees had cited a federal statute15 which permits the federal courts to
issue writs to aid their jurisdiction. The court here felt that any action
taken by the FAA against any of the defendants would have no detri-
mental effect on the court's jurisdiction. 16
While procedural safeguards are becoming a very significant area
in administrative law,17 the circuit court particularly avoided the entire
question. It was concerned basically with the interpretation of the
federal statute prohibiting illegal work stoppages and with the judicial
interference in administrative activities. For this reason, the case is in
line with precedents in the area and merely underlines the Second Cir-
cuit's tendency to exercise judicial restraint in interfering with adminis-
trative disciplinary proceedings.
SEC INVESTIGATION - DISCLOSURE
When an administrative agency gathers information or documents
in the course of an investigation, this information has usually been held
plaint and two weeks later it appealed the decision. All of these events had not transpired
at the time the district court granted the conditional injunction in PATCO.
15 The federal statute involved here was 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964), which states:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
Various courts have used this rationale in similar situations to affirm district courts' con-
ditional injunctions. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1970)
(Breitenstein, J., dissenting) which dealt with a protective order issued by the courts with
its injunctive relief, restraining FAA disciplinary action against air traffic controllers, pend-
ing disposition of issues of civil actions seeking permanent injunctions. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the order was authorized for purposes of maintaining the district court's
jurisdiction over the parties.
The Second Circuit did not accept the same rationale. It agreed with the dissent in
Moore which argued:
The majority hold that the protective order effected a permissible restoration and
maintenance of the status quo and was issued in aid of the district court's jurisdic-
tion as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651. These reasons, considered either separately
or collectively, do not warrant the judicial encroachment on executive powers
which results from the protective order.
Id. at 1025.
In PA TCO the court quoted from the Supreme Court which stated in DeBeers Consol.
Mines Ltd. v. United States, 525 U.S. 212, 220 (1945),
Section 1651 cannot be used to allow a court to deal "with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit."
438 F.2d at 81-82.1 6 See 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE 54.10[5] at 106 (2d ed. 1966) which stated that
the court would retain subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
17 The case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), outlined the various procedural
safeguards required in an evidentiary proceeding prior to the termination of welfare bene-
fits. Its impact was undoubtedly felt -in the district court's decision in PATCO.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
to be confidential. LaMorte v. Mansfield,18 on the other hand,, has
severely narrowed this privilege of confidentiality afforded the agency
in its maintenance of investigatory proceedings. The petitioner in this
case was a defendant in a stockholders action 19 who had given testimony
at a nonpublic investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).20 LaMorte petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
require the court to vacate an order directing him to relinquish the
transcripts to the plaintiffs. The court held that since the petitioner had
requested a transcript of the earlier investigation and since the SEC had
placed no restrictions on disclosure of its contents, the transcript was
not protected by any privilege of nondisclosure and he would be re-
quired to make the transcript available to the plaintiffs and co-defen-
dants.21
LaMorte based its ruling on its construction of various federal sta-
tutes. Traditionally, non-public investigation records have been held to
be confidential as prescribed by federal statute, amended in 1961.22
However, under another federal statute, the transcript of testimony
given in such a non-public investigation 23 must be released by the
agency to the witness upon request.24 The instant case has added its
18 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971).
19Zeints v. LaMorte, 319 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), was an action brought by
Zeints and other stockholders against LaMorte, a corporate officer, for alleged violation of
the federal securities laws. The district court ruled that LaMorte must furnish the plain-
tiffs with a copy of the transcript of the SEC investigation.
20 Petitioner had secured copies of the transcript pursuant to SEC Reg. B, 17 C.F.R.
§ 203.6 (1970). In refusing to furnish the plaintiffs with the transcript, petitioner LaMorte
stated that the interrogation by the SEC had been a confidential communication and
therefore he was privileged not to disclose it. 438 F.2d at 449.
21 The court was spurred to write an opinion in this case by the realization that the
problem was a recurring one. In White v. Jaegerman, 51 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the
district court had held that the transcripts of an earlier SEC investigation could be subject
to discovery and thus should be admitted over the objection of the former witness. While
White is not a dear precedent for the LaMorte decision, it seemed to foreshadow a
broader usage of the heretofore confidential transcripts.
22SEC Reg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-4 (1961) states:
Information or documents obtained by officers or employees of the Commission
of any examination or investigation pursuant to section 17 (a) . . . (15 U.S.C.
78q(a)) or 21(a) ... (15 U.S.C. 78u(a)) shall, unless made a matter of public record,
be deemed confidential. Officers and employees are hereby prohibited from making
such confidential information or documents or any other nonpublic records of
the Commission available to anyone other than a member, officer, or employee
of the Commission, unless the Commission authorizes the disclosure of such in-
formation or the production of such documents as not being contrary to the public
interest....
23 Under SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 203.2 (1964),
information or documents obtained by the Commission in the course of any in-
vestigation or examination, unless made a matter of public record shall be deemed
non-public.
24 SEC Reg. B, 17 C.F.R. § 203.6 (1970) provides:
A person who has submitted documentary evidence or testimony in a formal in-
vestigative proceeding shall be entitled to procure a copy of his documentary
evidence or a transcript of his testimony on payment of the appropriate fees. In
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own interpretation of the statute by saying that once the transcript has
been released to the witness, it is no longer considered confidential. As
the court stated, "[t]o the extent that a privilege exists, it is the agency's,
not the witness'." 25
The LaMorte decision undoubtedly will have an impact on the
agency privilege of secrecy so explicitly guarded in the past by federal
statute. The eventual piercing of the agency's veil of secrecy was a two-
step process. First, by statute, the SEC was required to furnish a witness
in a non-public investigation with a copy of his own transcript. 26 Second,
in the present case, the court held that once this release had been made
without an SEC restriction on witness disclosure, the protective cloak
disappeared, so that he has no privilege of secrecy when asked to dis-
close its contents. 27
any event, any witness (or his counsel), upon proper identification, shall have
the right to inspect the official transcript of the witness' own testimony.
Until 1970, the statute contained a discretionary caveat which stated:
Provided, however, That in a nonpublic formal investigative proceeding a person
seeking a transcript of his testimony shall file a written request stating the reason
he desires to procure such transcript, and the Commission may for good cause deny
such request.
The statute has been amended to give the witness an absolute right to a transcript of his
testimony.
25 The court elaborated upon this idea:
The agency is free to withdraw the veil of secrecy, and once the witness has been
allowed to obtain the transcript of his testimony, it is no more privileged or con-
fidential in his hands-absent any restriction placed by the agency on disclosure
of its contents -than any other record of a previous statement would be.
438 F.2d at 451.
To bolster its decision, the court noted that the Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1966), by amending section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, has significantly in-
creased the public availability of agency records. The court inferred that the legislative
intent was to make access to agency records easier and thus decided here that it would be
in the public interest to hold that this transcript was now a public document.
26 Prior to the amended portion of SEC Reg. B, 17 C.F.R. § 203.6 (1970), the SEC
could refuse to release such a transcript. In Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856
(7th Cir. 1966), a case involving individuals who had been named as defendants in an in-
junction suit brought by the SEC, in which they requested that the SEC permit them to
purchase transcripts of their testimony at an SEC hearing, the court upheld the SEC's
denial of such a request and held that the decision whether or not to release transcripts
of non-public investigations was in the agency's discretion. Commercial Capital arose under
§ 6(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act prior to the Information Act of 1966 and prior
to the amendment to SEC Keg. B, 17 C.F.R. § 203.6 (1970), which made transcript release
to a witness mandatory.
27 The court rejected the contention that it was Congress' intent to increase the con-
fidentiality of agency data. In St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961),
the Supreme Court had held that the confidentiality provisions of the Census Act
did not prevent other branches of the government from compelling a respondent
to produce copies of [census] reports that it had given the Bureau ..... [How-
ever,] the St. Regis case was ... overruled [by Congressional action] in 1962 [by
enactment of 13 U.S.C. § 59(a)(3) (1964)], and retained copies of census reports
are now immune from subpoena.
Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in
an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Micii. L. REv. 1091, 1183-84 (1969).
The Second Circuit felt that this Congressional action had little effect on the LaMorte
[Vol. 46:415
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The impact of such a decision is great. The very purpose of label-
ing an investigation non-public is undercut.28 If the agency must release
transcripts to witnesses and witnesses have no privilege of secrecy once
the transcript is in their hands, then the agency's privilege of confiden-
tiality will, in effect, be greatly decreased. The court has thus inter-
preted the federal statute on transcript disclosure to effectuate a signifi-
cant piercing of the agency's veil of secrecy.
ANTiBIoTIcS CERTIFICATION - EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The right of an aggrieved party to an evidentiary hearing of an ad-
ministrative action is not an absolute one.29 It has often been held that
where a hearing is not a matter of right by statute,30 the party must
establish some valid basis for its request.31 The Second Circuit Court of
situation because the effectiveness of the Census Bureau was dependent upon a guarantee
of confidentiality, whereas in the SEC investigation a person is under a subpoena to testify
and thus is testifying not as a result of a promise of confidentiality but on penalty of
contempt.
28 Nonpublic investigations have traditionally retained their aura of inaccessibility
due to the realization that they
might be thwarted in certain cases if not kept secret, and that if witnesses were
given a copy of their transcript, suspected violators would be in a better position
to tailor their own testimony to that of the previous testimony, and to threaten
witnesses about to testify with economic or other reprisals.
438 F.2d at 451, quoting Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1966).
29 The courts have differed on the question of whether an individual affected by ad-
ministrative action is entitled to a hearing. Some courts have warned against agency action
without an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Gas &- Water Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 427 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court stated that an agency should
exercise restraint against the temptation to take action without notice and a hearing.
In the same vein, courts have discussed the question of a hearing by stating, "[Tihe need
for administrative flexibility does not of itself preclude an agency hearing or judicial
review." Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 1.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970). Other courts, however, have
reiterated the traditional maxim that "[A] hearing is not constitutionally compelled in
all cases where individual rights may be impaired." See Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
30 A hearing before an agency is a right when required by statute or when the agency's
action may deprive an individual of due process. Where there is no mandatory statutory
requirement of a hearing, the courts will evaluate such factors as: the nature of the interest
effected, the availability of judicial review, and the immediacy of the case. See Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See Note, Summary Removal
of Drugs from the Market: The Specter of the Heavy Bureaucratic Hand, 24 Sw. L.J. 880,
881 n.ll (1970).
31 In discussing the question of an evidentiary hearing, the courts generally make a
distinction between whether the agency's action had involved adjudication or rule-making.
As a general rule, the agencies are not permitted to act adjudicatively without a hearing,
whereas in rule-making, a hearing is not required. Adjudicative facts are those which
concern the parties involved, i.e., they answer the question of "who did what, where, when,
how, why and with what motive or intent." Rule-making (or legislative) facts do no con-
cern the immediate parties, but are general facts which are used to assist in establishing
policy and discretion. These distinctions, however, are often unsatisfactory in various re-
spects, as shall be seen in the instant case. 1 K. DAvis, ADMiNIsrRATrvE LAw TREATISE 412-
13 (1958).
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